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PROTECTION OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS:
RESURRECTION OF THE STANDARD
I. Introduction
By constitutional mandate, Congress is authorized
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries."
Even though this directive has been statutorily implemented, 2 and that statute
often amended,8 the constitutional purpose has yet to be fully satisfied. Thus far,
the thrust of Article 1, section 8, clause 8 has been hampered by patent laws
that are antiquated in focus,4 haphazard in application,5 and ineffective in pro-
tection.' These deficiencies are obvious in respect to that most modem "useful
art," the computer program.
This note will examine the modes of protection available for the com-
puter program and inquire why, in light of the above statutes, resort must be
had to a common law tort remedy: the "trade secrets" doctrine.7 In that regard,
the continued vitality of patent protection will be evaluated. A conclusion will
follow that patent protection, if it is to exist at all, must ultimately derive from
the courts, not the legislature.
II. Protection of Computer Programs
A. Generally
Any successful scheme for the promotion of technical progress must be
predicated upon protection of the invention within a competitive structure. It
should provide the inventor the recovery of his investment and enable him to
secure a reward for his genius.' On a larger scale, it must foster the influx of
speculative capital into the marketplace,9 without which progress is piecemeal
at best. Concomitantly, the protective scheme must not be so severe that reason-
able competition is thwarted. This is especially so in the computer industry.
I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8.
2 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
3 For a detailed account of the legislative history of Title 35, see Federico, Commentary
on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1-70 (1954).
4 See 119 CoNG. Rc. 2865 (daily ed. April 17, 1973) '(remarks of Rep. Owens).
5 Id.
6 Fully 72 percent of the patents litigated in the Federal courts of appeals are held
invalid, and fewer than 20 percent of the litigated patents are upheld as valid and
infringed.... Such a high rate of invalidity means that many more patents issue
than are warranted. Simply put, this means that the Patent Office has not been
doing its job of weeding out bad and unjustified patents. Id. at 2866.
7 Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WAsu. L. Rlv. 909 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Bender, Trade Secrets].
8 Bender, Computer Programs: Should They Be Patentable? 68 COLUm. L. REv. 241,
244 n.19 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Bender, Patents].
9 Id. at 245 n.21.
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Indeed, if "some of the biggest progress in the future will come from a thorough
understanding of software,"'" the hardware" manufacturers who market com-
puter programs must be confronted with a strong software industry. 2 However,
programming is a very expensive science" and protection must be afforded to
make the investment worthwhile. The types of protection available are: patent,
copyright, and trade secret protection.
B. Patent Protection
Among the available alternatives, the patent offers the most comprehensive
protection. It gives to the holder the exclusive right to make, use, or sell his
invention.'" In effect, upon the grant of a patent, the holder obtains a seventeen-
year monopoly"5 over his invention, even as against one who independently
develops it.' The crucial benefit which the patent confers on the computer
programmer is the certainty that any unauthorized use of the program will con-
stitute a patent infringement for which an adequate remedy can be secured."
When a patent is obtained, there is no need to ascertain whether there was a
"copying," as would be necessary under a copyright, 8 or an "unethical acquisi-
tion," essential to a trade secret violation. 9 The mere use of the patented pro-
gram, without more, would be sufficient.
Since it is the program which is the "intellectual heart of computer opera-
tion,"' 0 tremendous economic leverage would thus be available to the computer
programmer who obtained patent protection on a significant software innovation.
This explains, in large part, the clamor by computer programmers to secure
patent protection and the equally clamorous outcry by hardware manufacturers
against it during the last decade." This controversy grew more intense with
10 Id. at 244 n.18.
11 Hardware and software are terms of the trade used to designate the manufacturer
and his respective product. Hardware is the physical machine with its circuits. memory units,
calculating devices, and switches. Hardware manufacturers include, among others, IBM and
Honeywell. The software is the computer porgram, a set of operating instructions which the
harware uses in its processing of data. The software producers are those who market the
programs alone, independent of any equipment. They include the Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Applied Data Research, Inc., and Computer Software
Analysts, Inc. IBM, since 1971, has been marketing its hardware and software separately, a
process known as "unbundling," which was supposed to make the software market more
competitive. However, much of the controversy generated by the patentability of programs
issue has been the result of infighting between these two forces.
12 Bender, Patents at 245.
13 Id.
14 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1970).
15 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
16 This rule is the greatest asset of patent protection. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970) provides
that a patent shall issue unless the invention was patented in this or a foreign country. Once
the inventor has secured the patent, he has the right to exclude all others from its manu-
facture, use, or sale under § 271. This is the concept of "first inventorship." See 60 Am.
JUR. 2d Patents §§ 15-21 (1972).
17 35 U.S.C. § 281 '(1970).
18 2 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 141 (1963, Supp. 1974).
19 See 55 AM. JUR. 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices §
704 (1972).
20 Katona, Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 955, 956
(1965).
21 See Bender, Patents at 241 n.5. Since 1968, the arguments have focused more on the
decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, but the issue has become none the less
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the Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System22 which recom-
mended against the grant of patents on computer programs.2' The Patent Office,
consistent with its own interpretation, issued guidelines concerning the exami-
nation of patent applications on computer programs, which provided that com-
puter programming, whether defined in the mode of process or apparatus, would
not be patentable.24 Those guideliness were rejected, however, by the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals [hereinafter CCPA] in Application
of Prater," which marked the beginning to the COPA trend in favor of granting
patents to computer programs.
Application of Prater, which involved an invention for the processing and
analysis of spectrographic data through the use of a programmed digital com-
puter, initiated the new trend. The Patent Office Board of Appeals,26 after a
denial of the claim by the hearing examiner, predicated its rejection on 3a
U.S.C. § 101:27
[Tihe claim sets forth nothing which could not be performed purely as a
mental exercise using [Prater's] discovery . .. the caim did not therefore
fall within the statutory category of "process," as interpreted by court
decisions.28
controversial. See, e.g., Brothers and Grimaldi, Comment/In re Prater and Patent Reform
Proposals: "Debugging" the Patent Office's Administration of Computer Program Applications,
51 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 581 (1969); Woodcock, Mental Steps and Computer Programs, 52 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 275 (1970); Sutton, The "Mental Steps" Doctrine: A Critical Analysis in
Light of Prater and Wei, 13 IDEA 458 (1969); Iandiorio, Which Wei Did They Go? 53 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 712 (1971); Koller and Moshman, Patent Protection for Computer Software:
Implications for the Industry, 12 IDEA 1109 (1968); Koller, Computer Software Protection:
Report of an Institute Clinic, 13 IDEA 351 (1969); Nimtz, The Patentability of Computer
Programs, 1970 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & LAW 38; Edwards, Technological Progress &
Patent Law, 15 IDEA CoNF. No. 19 (1972); Note, Process Patents for Computer Programs, 56
CA!LiF. L. Rav. 466 (1968).
22 Established by Exec. Order No. 11215, 3 C.F.R. 123 (Supp. 1965).
23 The Report was released on December 8, 1966. In § IV, the Report recommended
that programs for data processing machines not be considered patentable, regardless of how
they were claimed. Report at 12. See Bender, Patents at 241 n.5.
24 "The basic principle to be applied is that computer programming per se, whether
defined in the form of process or apparatus, shall not be patentable." PATENT OFrice: Ex-
AMINATION OF PATENT APpLICA TIONS ON COMPUTER PROGRAMS, NoTIcE OF ISSUANCE oF"
GUIDELINES, 33 Fed. Reg. 15609 (1968). After the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
refused to adhere to these guidelines in Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1969),
the Patent Office rescinded the guidelines. 34 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1969).
25 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1969), aff'd in part and reu'd in part on rehearing, 415 F.2d
1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
26 The procedure to be followed for the application for a patent is specified in 35 U.S.C.§ 111-146 (1970). The claimant files his application with the Commissioner of Patents, who
then has the application inspected by a hearing examiner. The claim can be submitted and
rejected several times until it is refined to the absolute level of novelty. If it has been rejected
and the applicant does not prosecute his claim within six months, it is considered to be
abandoned. After the application has been twice rejected, the claimant can press forward to
the Board of Appeals. Then, if that board fails to sustain him, he can choose to appeal to
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. In the alternative, he may maintain a civil suit
against the Commissioner in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia,
and if the claimant prevails, the Commissioner is instructed to issue a patent.
27 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
This section must be read in conjunction with 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1970) which provides:
The term "process" means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter or material.
28 415 F.2d at 1382.
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The court carefully distinguished its precedents, noting 9 that in Application of
Abrams,"° decided eighteen years before Prater, the process sought to be patented
could be performed only in the mind while in Prater there was a full disclosure
of an apparatus for implementing the process without requiring any steps to be
performed in the mind. While in its rehearing of the case, the CCPA placed
substantial importance on the disclosure of an apparatus," it did not alter its
holding that a
process disclosed as being a sequence or combination of steps capable of
performance without human intervention and directed to an industrial
technology-a "useful art" within the intendment of the Constitution-is
not precluded [from patent protection] by the mere fact that the process
could alternatively be carried out by mental steps.32
Having sidestepped the "mental steps" obstacle, the COPA was ready to deal
with subsequent computer program questions in terms of "progress in tech-
nology" rather than in "alternative methods of achievement."
In Application of Bernhart,l the CCPA next decided the patentability of
a method and apparatus for converting a three-dimensional object into a two-
dimensional portrayal by means of a mathematical formula. While the court
noted the congressional intent to exclude laws of mathematics from patent-
ability, 4 it argued that all machines function according to some physical law
which, if known, could be mathematically expressed. 5 Consistent with a finding
that a machine is patentable subject matter,'6 as well as the statutory dictate that
the manner of invention should not negative the status of patentability, 7 the
COPA reasoned that it could not deny patents to machines merely because their
novelty was explainable in terms of mathematics. 8 The COPA also suggested
that the use of a computer program in a machine, if it did not constitute crea-
tion of a new machine, at least amounted to a new use of a known machine,
which qualified as a patentable process under 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(b), 101. '
Ultimately, the CCPA substituted a new doctrine in lieu of the "mental
steps" concept in Application of Musgrave."° There the issue involved a claim
for a process patent on a mathematical method which would delineate the nature
of subsurface formations in the earth's crust. Continuing its previous stance,
the Patent Office Board of Appeals rejected the claim as one predicated on a
mental process and thus predicated on nonstatutory subject matter."' On sub-
sequent appeal to the CCPA, that court proclaimed a new standard:
29 Id. at 1385.
30 188 F.2d 165 (C.O.P.A. 1951).
31 415 F.2d at 1403, 1405.
32 Id. at 1389.
33 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
34 Id. at 1399.
35 Id.
36 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 '(1970).
37 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
38 417 F.2d at 1399.
39 Id. at 1400.
40 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
41 Id. at 886.
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We cannot agree with the board that these claims are directed to non-
statutory processes merely because some or all of the steps therein can also
be carried out in or with the aid of the human mind or because it may be
necessary for one performing the processes to think. All that is necessary,
in our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory "process!'
within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be in the technological arts so as to be in
consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of
"useful arts."42
With Musgrave, the CCPA adopted a deliberate shift in standards.4 3 In
Prater the court placed much emphasis on the disclosure of apparatus in order
to sidestep the "mental steps" doctrine . 4 In Musgrave, the CCPA could easily
have acquiesced in precedent and held that (1) the process could be imple-
mented entirely by machine,45 or (2) that since no step in the process was purely
mental, the claim did not read on nonstatutory subject matter.4 Instead, it
announced that where the submitted process was "within the technological arts"
and "in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress of
useful art," it was patentable.
The extension of this rule is evidenced in a series of decisions subsequent to
Musgrave, where the CCPA held, inter alia, that a method of processing seismo-
grams was patentable,47 that a method of converting binary coded decimals
into pure binary numbers was patentable,4 8 that a method for symbolic data
retrieval was patentable,49 and finally, that a method for determining the com-
position of a data word was patentable."0 The standard which emerged from
these decisions stipulated that any process utilized in the field of electronic
data processing that heralded progress would be patentable so long as it satisfied
the other statutory requirements of novelty and nonobviousness. From the per-
spective of the CCPA, digital computer programs, even those that merely en-
hanced the internal operation of the machine, would be patentable, since they
would undoubtedly contribute to the progress of technological art.
Even though the grant of patentability seemed clear under the decisions
of the CCPA, the Supreme Court gave notice that review was imminent in its
grant of certiorari5 ' in Application of Benson."2 In Benson, the claim centered
on a method 3 for converting binary coded decimals into pure binary numbers,
42 Id. at 893.
43 Id. (concurring opinion). The fact that the shift was expressly exposed as a major
and radical shift yet adopted by the court gives clear indication that such an adoption was not
unintended.
44 415 F.2d at 1403, 1405.
45 Such a rationale would have been consistent with the decision in Prater so that a
confrontation with the "mental steps' doctrine could have been obviated. Id. at 894.
46 Id. '
47 Application of Foster, 438 F.2d 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
48 Application of Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (O.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub no., Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
49 Application of Mclroy, 442 F.2d 1397 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
50 Application of Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
51 Filing the petition for certiorari were the Justice Department, the Commerce Depart-
ment, and the Patent Office. Application of Benson, petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3039(U.S. Oct. 5, 1971) (No. 71-485).
52 405 U.S. 915 (1972).
53 Binary code is a numerical system which has a base of 2, rather than 10 which is the
base for the decimal system, and has merely two symbols (0,1) as opposed to the ten symbols
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a process which the CCPA had previously determined was patentable. The
Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the process claim was so abstract
and sweeping 4 that granting a patent on the claim would be tantamount to
granting a patent on the mathematical formula itself.5
Commentators and practitioners had hoped that the Supreme Court deci-
sion would quell the controversy centering on computer programs." They
were confronted instead with a decision that fostered further confusion. 7 Speak-
ing through Justice Douglas, the Court predicated its rejection of the patent
claim on two grounds: (1) There was no limitation or substantial application
of the claim so as to confine the monopoly within rather definite bounds,5" and
(2) Such an unlimited process was, in effect, the equivalent of an idea, upon
which a patent could not be granted.5
In its argument attacking the "process" aspect of the claim, the Court
maintained an inconsistent position. Despite its contention that the claim was so
broad and sweeping, the Court acknowledged that its only application was in
connection with the operation of a digital computer. The inherent nature of
binary code restricts its application and the cumbersome conversion process all
but precludes universal application of the process. Even the standard which the
Court enunciated to determine the patentability of a process was satisfied.
Quoting with approval the precedent of Tilghman u. Proctor,0 the Court stated
that the clue to patentability of a process not tied to a particular machine was
the transformation or reduction of an article to a different state or thing." Yet
that is precisely what occurs when the computer program is added to the memory
core of the computer. The program actually
of the decimal code. The binary code is especially suitable for electronic data processing
machines since it can be represented by the presence (1) or absence '(0) of a pulse. The binary
coded decimal is a halfway point between the decimal symbol and the pure binary symbol, and
is achieved by positional location of the binary symbol in its equivalent decimal position.
The Benson application claimed a method and apparatus to perform the conversion from
binary coded decimals to pure binary numbers.
54 409 U.S. 63, 68 (1972).
55 Id. at 72.
56 See note 20 supra. Nearly every article in its conclusion looked to the Supreme Court
as the appropriate forum for resolution of the patentability question.
57 For articles critical of the decision, see Dunner, Gambrell, White and Kayton, Non-
statutory Subject Matter, 14 JuRIMETascs 113 '(1973) [hereinafter cited as Dunner Non-
statutory Subject Matter]; Jacobs, Patents for Software Inventions-The Supreme Court's
Decision, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 59 (1973); Freed, Protection of Proprietary Programs in Light
of Benson and Tabbot, 13 JuRiMETRics 139 (1973); Sher, Comment: Comm. of Patents v.
Benson et al., 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 179 (1974); Milgrim, Software, Carfare and Benson,
13 JURIMETRScs 240 (1973). For differing analyses, see Duggan, Patents on Programs? The
Supreme Court Says No, 13 JuSMET.nuCs 135 (1973); Note, 14 B.C. IND. & ComM. L. Rlv.
1050 (1973). See also, Bigelow, Infosystems, The Law and Patents, 13 JumsETRaics 129
(1973); Note, Are Computer Programs Ever Patentable? Did the Patent Office Win? 13
JuramETmcs 248 (1973).
58 409 U.S. at 69. See, Sher, Comment: Comm. of Patents v. Benson et al., 56 J. PAT.
OFF. Soo'y 179, 180-81 (1974).
59 409 U.S. at 71, 72.
60 102 U.S. 707 '(1880). It was the reliance of the Court on such antiquated cases
where the questioned processes did not even resemble the computer program process that has
caused consternation among commentators and practitioners. It is unclear why the Court
relied on these precedents rather than evaluating those enunciated by the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals which focused directly on computer program processes. See Dunner,
Nonstatutory Subject Matter at 117; Sher, Comment: Comm. of Patents v. Benson et al., 56
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 179, 180 (1974).
61 409 U.S. at 70.
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changes the physical conditions of the internal memories of computers,
thereby creating tailored electronic circuits, as distinguished from hardwired
circuits not so readily alterable but probably more easily patentable. Those
new media either cause magnetized spots to be placed on surfaces of mem-
ory media or magnetize memory cores selectively. While the resulting
changes in condition might in some cases be considered to serve as records
of information on the new media, they represent physical elements that
provide control and guidance of machines that process information auto-
matically.6 2
-An understanding of the operation of the computer and the effect that a pro-
gram has on its operation is crucial to an intelligent evaluation of the patent-
ability issue. It is singularly unfortunate that a disregard for the facts or a mis-
conception of operation mechanics should serve as the basis for a denial of
patent protection."
A further critique of the Court's decision results from its deduction that a
formula that lacks practical application outside a digital computer is the equiv-
alent of an idea. A claim which is directed to the use of a mathematical formula
to enhance the internal operation of a computer simply cannot be considered
an idea." The particular end to which the program is directed can neither add
to nor detract from the character of the claim which is based on the program.
The final criticism which can be leveled against Benson arises from its debil-
itative impact on future policy. While the Court did not categorically deny
patents to software, it effectively precluded resort to this type of protection. The
varied interpretations of the holding,65 as well as the suspect integrity of the
decision itself, give credence to the argument that some computer programs
might be patentable, but the cost of litigation 6 makes that argument a specious
one. Further, the Court implicitly approved an arbitrary policy of discrimination
whereby patents can be obtained on hardware circuits yet cannot be obtained
62 See Freed, Protection of Proprietary Programs in Light of Benson and Tabbot, 13
JURIMETRIcS 139, 140 (1973).
63 To many commentators, the facts were disregarded so that a preordained decision
could be delivered, denying patentability to software, and thereby appeasing the hardware
manufacturers. The Patent Office had long ago spoken against patentability of programs,
premising their argument on the difficulty in creating a search and classification technique to
evaluate the prior art. It is arguable, however, that any such program is necessarily doomed
since more is expected than can mechanically be accomplished, since no program could have
the hardware "analyze" the prior art. A more modest program, one that would merely tag
similar patents for scrutiny by an examiner, might be more successful. Certain classification
keys could be established, such as purpose, similarity of operational sequence, similarity of
material, which would facilitate the search. Nevertheless. the Patent Office has staunchly
maintained its position. Further pressure seems to have developed by the entry of the
Justice Department which has consistently sought to limit the expanse of the patent law.
See Dunner, Nonstatutory Subject Matter at 118 & n.2, 119 n.3.
64 See Dunner, Nonstatutory Subject Matter at 114.
65 For a view in favor of the broad interpretation that no software is patentable, see,
Duggan, Patents on Programs? The Supreme Court Says No, 13 Juiaumnmcs 135, 136 (1973).
But see, Jacobs, Patents for Software Inventions-The Supreme Court's Decision, 13 JuRI-
w'mcs 132 (1973). Two attorneys who filed amicus briefs, Morton Jacobs for ADAPSO
favoring protection and Elmer Galbi of IBM opposing it, have noted that Benson was a fairly
narrow holding. See, Dunner, Nonstatutory Subject Matter at 119 n.5. But see the ominous
announcements of the Patent Office that all decisions will be reviewed for possible application
of Benson. Dunner, Nonstatutory Subject Matter at 122 n.32.
66 See 119 CoNG. R-u. 2865, 2866 (daily ed. April 17, 1973) (remarks of Rep. Owens).
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on their software equivalents.67 It sanctioned a policy of the Patent Office
clearly favorable to the giants in the electronic data processing industry and
emasculated the decisions of the CCPA which had redressed that imbalance.6 "
Finally, by its decision, the Court unduly frustrated the constitutional directive
to promote the progress of useful art.69 It denied the computer program the
comprehensive protection necessary for full disclosure to be effective and stunted
the concomitant improvement. In an industry where only a small part of its
potential has been realized, the Court has impeded further developments by
making secrecy rather than disclosure the only means of protection.
C. Copyright Protection
Copyright protection confers on the author-recipient the exclusive right to
print, publish, copy, vend, translate, deliver, and perform the copyrighted work6
for a period of twenty-eight years.7 1 The unprivileged exercise of any of these
enumerated rights is a "copying" which may amount to infringement.72
Copyright protection was made expressly available for computer programs
by virtue of a 1964 announcement of the Copyright Office .7  Nevertheless,
this mode has been criticized for offering too little protection by failing to center
its protection on the crux of the computer program. 4 The copyright extends
only to the peculiar expression which the writing takes and not to the underlying
idea itself. This inherent limitation of copyright protection must be recognized.
It extends only to the prohibition of unauthorized duplication; it does not extend
to protection against unauthorized use. 5 Whereas copyright can frustrate the
intentional reproduction of a writing, only the patent can protect against use of
an inventive idea. This distinction must be appreciated if confusion between
copyright and patent is to be avoided and the stricter requirements for a patent
justified.
67 Jacobs, Patents for Software Inventions-The Supreme Court's Decision, 13 JURiMETRcS
132, 133 (1973).
68 See Duggan, Patents on Programs? The Supreme Court Says No, 13 JURIMETRICS 135,
137 (1973); Note, 14 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 1050, 1060 '(1973).
69 The near unanimous response to the Benson decision has been inquiry into the avail-
ability as well as the efficacy of trade secret protection. See, e.g., Milgrim, Software, Carfare
and Benson, 13 Jurim-Tmcs 241, 244-47 (1973).
70 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
71 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
72 2 M. NimMFR, COPYRIGHT §§ 141-49 '(1963, Supp. 1974).
73 See Cary, Copyright Registration and Computer Programs, 11 BULL. COPYmGT Soc'Y
362, 367 (1964). That announcement has received legislative sanction. Proposed § 102(a)
of the Copyright Law Revision, S. 1361, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) provides:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship, fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device .... (emphasis supplied).
74 See Bender, Patents, supra note 8, at 249.
75 The question which will ultimately have to be resolved is whether the hardware "copies"
the software when it processes information in accordance with the program. It is clearly a
"use" as envisioned by patent protection, but is it a "copying" of the program? Manipula-
tion of the copyright laws could produce such a result, but the wiser course would be to respect
the distinction between patent rights and copyright, and hold that there must be some ele-
ment of intent for copying, i.e., a deliberate reproduction of the instructions. One caveat need
be offered. Copying need not be limited to a particular medium. A fourth-generation hardware
could conceivably copy a program used by a third-generation machine. Whether that argument
will be judicially upheld will determine the future efficacy of copyright protection.
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Such a restriction does not fully emasculate copyright protection. It is still
an effective means to protect the valuable computer program which fails to
satisfy the requirements for a patent."6 Such programs include long compilations
for data processing where the key benefit is the minimal use of costly computer
time. The complex nature of these more sophisticated programs is such that
only a skilled programmer can discern the root idea. To maintain the time saving
factor while incorporating the basic premise of the old program into a schemati-
cally different yet functionally equivalent new program would be difficult. The
time and expense required for such a translation and the ethics of the profession
would sustain the value of copyright protection.
With innovative computer programs, the key benefit is not minimal time
use but the novel approach to problem solving. Even though the particular
expression of the program is all that can be protected by copyright, the inventive
idea is often inextricably wound within its expression and the protection of the
expression necessarily protects the idea. Thus, the line dividing the sanctioned
"borrowing" of an idea and the infringing "copying" of an expression blurs when
a complex computer program is involved.
The actual effectiveness of copyright protection will be dictated by the
judicial determination of infringement. The courts are free to develop a stan-
dard consistent with a limitation of copyright which offers effective protection
against piracy.7 No court has yet adjudicated an alleged copyright infringement
of a computer program, but it is clear that present standards for literary infringe-
ment are inadequate. The technical nature of a computer program requires a
new test for infringement. Factors which ought to be considered in developing
this test include: (1) focus and purpose of the programs, (2) similarity of
operational sequences, (3) significance of dissimilar material," (4) common
errors, 79 and (5) repetition or appearance of a unique or qualitatively signif-
icant term."0 The appearance of these elements, cumulatively weighed, would
establish the inference of copying, which would shift to the alleged infringer
the burden of establishing the independent nature of his program."'
Thus, effective copyright protection is not totally precluded. With com-
pilation programs, timesaving sequences can be protected and piracy prevented.
Further, even though the copyright cannot be directed at the inventive idea
alone, it can afford protection when the idea is inextricably wound within the
program's sequence. Finally, if a new definition of infringement were adopted,
76 See Bender, Patents, supra note 8, at 250.
77 17 U.S.C. § 101 '(1970) provides that if a copyright is infringed, the recipient shall
have remedies extending from injunction and damages to impounding and destruction of the
infringing material. While there is a listing of the available remedies, there is no definition
of what conduct would amount to an infringement. Presumably, the courts are left to develop
a case-by-case definition. See 2 M. NImMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 141-49 (1963, Supp. 1974).
78 2 M. NIMmER, COPYRIGHT § 143.2 (1963, Supp. 1974).
79 Id. § 143.3.
80 Stratchborneo v. ARC Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1404 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). For
other judicial determinations which might be analogized to copyright protection for computer
programs, see Consolidated Music Pub., Inc. v. Hansen Publications, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1161,
1165 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Worth Publishers, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 415, 420
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
81 2 M. NiMMER, COPYRIGHT § 139.4 (1963. Supp. 1974).
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the copyright could become an effective deterrent to unauthorized use of com-
puter programs.
D. Trade Secrets
Trade secret protection extends to any formula, pattern, device, or com-
pilation of information used in one's business which provides an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.82 The doctrine
affords the owner of a trade secret a tort remedy when his secret has been un-
lawfully obtained or unethically acquired.8" To qualify for resort to this mode of
protection, minimal requirements must be satisfied. The need for secrecy is not
absolute; it need only be a substantial secrecy such that it is difficult for others
to acquire.84 There is no requirement for invention or originality, although some
originality must exist if the secret is to be a trade secret at all.85 To establish his
claim for relief, the owner of the trade secret need only prove its existence, its
value to the business, his right to use it, and the acquisition by the defendant
through unlawful or unethical means.8"
Since his work falls within the standard enunciated for protection, the
computer programmer has ready access to this device. Unlike the patent, it is
not necessary to follow any prescribed course of conduct before the work can be
protected. Unlike the patent, the secret is not limited to any particular written
claim; it is as expansive as the secret itself.87 There is no cost to maintain the
protection, nor is there the risk that after substantial expense and litigation no
protection will be realized. Further, the burden of establishing an infringement
is absent and the programmer's complaint is bolstered by the natural aversion
of the courts to practices which compromise business integrity.
82 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5 (1939).
83 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) provides:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable
to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the
other, in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a
secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the third
person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that its
disclosure was made to him by mistake. Id. at 1, 2.
84 55 AM. Jura. 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices §
706 (1972).
85 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment a at 5, comment b at 7, 8 (1939).
86 55 Am. JUR. 2d Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 704
(1972).
87 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 '(1970) which provides:
The specification in the patent application shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention....
There is no equivalent requirement for the trade secret. When there is an unlawful or
unethical appropriation of any formula, pattern, or device which provides the owner a competi-
tive advantage, he can present a claim for relief.
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Despite these benefits and the relative ease of access to such protection, the
programmer who resorts to the trade secret device does not acquire a full measure
of protection for his inventive idea. The legitimate acquisition of another's trade
secret is no cause for liability, since such liability is predicated on unlawful
appropriation, breach of a confidential relation, or breach of a contractual
agreement. 8 More importantly, resort to the trade secret device imposes serious
constraints on technological advance. Secrecy necessarily encourages suspicion,
duplicates effort, and restricts efficiency. Critical evaluation of programs is
crucial if progress is to be realized, yet resort to the remedy of trade secrets
precludes analysis of the secret and fails to utilize the cornerstone of improvement,
the free exchange of ideas. Thus, the trade secret device must be recognized as a
halfway measure. While it provides protection to the programmer, it secures
nothing in terms of disclosure. Yet, the publication of new ideas and techniques
is essential if technological progress is to be more than piecemeal and haphazard.
The constitutional mandate to promote the progress of science and useful arts
is prohibited by any device which provides limited protection at the expense of
future progress. In an industry where only a small portion of potential growth
has been realized, such expediency is too expensive a price to pay.
III. Conclusion
It is still too early to gauge accurately the full impact of the Supreme Court's
decision in Benson to reverse the trend toward patentability enunciated by the
COPA. One result is clearly discernible, however. The CCPA standard has been
quietly, albeit reluctantly, abandoned. In Application of Christensen,9 decided
one year after Benson, the claim centered on a method for determining the
porosity of subsurface formations. The only departure from prior art consisted
in the mathematical formula." The claim, with novelty predicated on the
equation, would have satisfied the earlier standards of patentability; nevertheless,
the CCPA concluded that if the only point of novelty in the application resided
in the mathematical formula, then, consistent with Benson, the claim for patent-
ability could not be granted."
Skepticism still plagues the efficacy of copyright protection for computer
programs. With no court decisions for guidance, and no clear-cut indication that
copyright infringement suits will be better received than patent infringement
actions, business acumen dictates against this mode of protection, since the
competitive advantage of any novel programs would be lost through disclosure.
The programmer's only current recourse is to treat the program as a trade
secret. Certainly, where protection with disclosure cannot be obtained, protection
without disclosure is a legitimate recourse. 2 Yet, even here drawbacks abound.
When the trade secret remedy is utilized, future progress is sacrificed for im-
88 Bender, Trade Secrets, supra note 7, at 930.
89 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
90 Id. at 1394.
91 Id. Such a pronouncement renders suspect the validity of the logic as well as the
patent in Application of Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (1969).




mediate protection with the result that new developments are more costly, less
beneficial, and less certain. To sacrifice the future efficiency of the electronic
data processing industry for present expediency is inconsistent with the idea of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts. Yet, that is precisely the result
dictated by Benson. Secrecy has become the only certain method to secure pro-
tection. The remaining question then becomes simply how desirable is this
alternative, especially since the ready resort to secrecy by the inventor leads in-
exorably to "scientific and technical asphyxiation."9 Surely no result is more
anomalous with the constitutional directive.
However, it should not be concluded that patent protection which achieves
the optimum balance between protection and disclosure remains completely
foreclosed. In deciding Benson, the Supreme Court requested special congres-
sional action if a shift in policy in favor of patentability of programs were to be
made.94 Legislative sanction for computer programs would definitely resolve any
questions and would foster a more receptive attitude toward programmers in
the courts during infringement suits. However, the likelihood of such legislation
is minimal, as the past history of proposed general revision bills clearly indicates.95
Perhaps a special purpose bill, related solely to granting patent protection to
computer programs, would fare better than the general revision proposals.
Such optimism, however, conflicts with the success of hardware manufacturers
in preventing software producers from securing protection. Software producers
would undoubtedly be confronted with the same vigorous opposition that frus-
trated their earlier arguments before the President's Commission and the Patent
Office. Finally, it is difficult to portray the drastic need for implementation of
patent protection by legislative action when the software industry is rapidly ex-
panding without it."5 Arguments for even better performance are apt to receive
scant attention. Thus, the likelihood that Congress will provide patent protection
seems small indeed.
Another alternative is that the Supreme Court might perceive the need to
reassess its earlier pronouncement, so as to define the status of software with
greater certainty. The nature of software does not inherently preclude such a
posture. Such a response is unlikely to arise, however, since Benson was directed
to a particular claim and was not intended as a general evaluation on the patent-
ability of computer programs.9 Further, it appears that the Court was reluctant
to take the initial steps necessary to make patent protection available. Instead,
the policy decision was foisted upon the Congress.'
Only the CCPA seems capable of resurrecting patent protection for the
93 Mahon, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 536, 551 (1968).
94 409 U.S. at 73.
95 See 119 CoNG. Rnc. 2865, 2866 (daily ed. April 17, 1973) (remarks of Rep. Owens).
96 See Galbi, The Prospect of Future Legislation and Court Action Concerning the Pro-
tection of Programming, 13 JuRiMETcs 234, 236 (1973).
97 Such success is witnessed in the Report of the President's Commission on Patents,
supra note 23, which recommended against patentability as well as in the Guidelines promul-
gated by the Patent Office, supra note 24. It is also apparent from the absence of any specific
protective legislation.
98 See McLaughlin, A Survey of 1974 dp Budgets, DATAMATION, February 1974, at 54.
99 409 U.S. at 71.
100 409 U.S. at 73.
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computer program. The quickest and most effective means to that end would
be for the court to reassert its standard of patentability through a careful dis-
tinction of Benson. Since that decision is susceptible to a variety of interpreta-
tions, ' the CCPA could choose to apply it narrowly. In doing so, it would be
faithful to the interpretation advanced by the Supreme Court yet consistent with
the constitutional directive to promote the progress of science and useful art.
Such a posture would hopefully prod both the Patent Office and Congress to
provide measures whereby hardware and software equivalents would be pro-
vided the same protection. Justification for such a stance would be grounded on
the expertise and familiarity which the CCPA has developed with the computer
program. Support would likewise come from the basic concept of fairness, which
only this court seems to have appreciated, that if hardware circuitry is granted a
patent, then its engineering equivalent, the computer program, should be offered
the same protection. A final rationale might be adduced from the interpreta-
tive role of the CCPA, which has the responsibility to evaluate patent claims in
light of the patent law as well as the constitutional directive. Where the only
alternative is a policy of blatant discrimination between data processing
equivalents, the COPA must assume this posture if patent protection for com-
puter programs is ever to be gained.
John J. McHugh III
101 See note 65 supra.
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